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1. An anniversary 
2007 saw the fiftieth anniversary of Everett’s proposal (1957) for how to solve quantum 
theory’s notorious ‘measurement problem’. To commemorate it, two conferences were 
held: at Oxford University, UK, and the Perimeter Institute for Theoretical Physics, 
Canada. In this book, the organizers have collected most of the papers, by physicists as 
well as philosophers, which were presented; together with some other papers and 
discussions.  
 I should begin by describing the measurement problem and standard quantum 
theory's response to it. The measurement problem (‘Schroedinger’s cat paradox’) is the 
threat that the lack of values for physical quantities such as position, momentum and 
energy, which is characteristic of quantum theory's description of microscopic systems 
such as electrons, should also infect the familiar macroscopic realm of tables, chairs---
what J.L.Austin called ‘medium-sized dry goods’---with their apparently definite values 
for position, momentum etc. The threat is clearest if one considers a measurement 
situation. Quantum theory apparently predicts that measuring, for example, the 
momentum of an electron, when it is in a state that is not definite for momentum, (a 
‘superposition  of momentum eigenstates’) should lead to the pointer of the apparatus 
having no definite position---it should be in a superposition of position eigenstates. 
By about 1935, standard quantum theory had settled on the following response to 
this problem. One postulates that the quantum state of both the microscopic system and 
the apparatus changes discontinuously after the measurement interaction, so that the 
apparatus' pointer gets a definite position. (This postulate is called the ‘projection 
postulate’; the change of state is called, more colloquially, the ‘collapse of the wave-
packet’.) This is of course unsatisfactory, since ‘measurement’ is vague. And there is 
worse trouble: the projection postulate contradicts quantum theory's usual law of how 
states change over time, viz. the Schroedinger equation, which prescribes a continuous 
and deterministic evolution. 
Everett proposes that one can solve the measurement problem without any 
recourse to the projection postulate. In brief: he claims that the universe as a whole has a 
quantum state, which always evolves according to the Schroedinger equation. Agreed: 
the measurement problem suggests this state will be a superposition corresponding to 
many different definite macroscopic realms (‘macrorealms’). But Everett suggests that 
we should explain our experience of a single definite macrorealm, by postulating that all 
the various definite macrorealms are actual. Thus the universe (what philosophers 
nowadays call ‘the actual world’) contains a plethora of Everettian ‘worlds’, where each 
such ‘world’ is something like the familiar macroscopic realm, with all tables, chairs etc. 
in definite positions. But the worlds differ among themselves about these positions, i.e. 
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about where the various macroscopic objects are; and we just happen to be in one world  
rather than any of the others. Hence this book’s title. 
This dizzying vision obviously calls out for philosophical clarification, since it 
involves central metaphysical topics such as possibility and persistence through time. 
Indeed, it also bears on the relation between mind and matter. For some versions of 
Everett’s proposal envisage an ontology of many `minds'; i.e. they claim that to each 
sentient brain (a human's, a cat's …) there corresponds a plethora of minds (or if you 
prefer, mental states): their experiences differing about such matters as the location of 
macroscopic objects. 
Since Everett’s original proposal in 1957, a philosophical literature about it has 
grown up: especially since the 1980s, with the growth of philosophy of physics 
(Butterfield (1995, 2000) were two of my own attempts). But it still remains controversial, 
and indeed, not precisely defined: ‘the Everett interpretation’ remains a vague definite 
description. All the more reason, then, to scrutinize the various formulations, and to 
thoroughly assess them.  
In this excellent book, some of today’s most gifted practitioners—some in physics, 
and some in philosophy---undertake this task. Apart from the conferences’ papers, 
including three replies and three transcripts of discussions (about ten pages each), the 
book also contains a few other invited papers; and a long, very helpful introduction by 
Saunders.  
The standard is high. All the papers are worth reading, most are worth studying, 
and some will last as major contributions to the literature. Besides, approximately the 
same number of papers (or of pages) is devoted to advocacy of the Everett interpretation, 
as to criticism of it. So the book is even-handed, and a ‘must-read’ for anyone keen on, or 
sceptical of, the interpretation. Indeed, of the four editors, two are Everettians (Saunders 
and Wallace), one (Kent) is opposed, and the fourth (Barrett) is agnostic. The book also 
contains some discussions of rival interpretations of quantum theory, especially the pilot-
wave approach of de Broglie and Bohm. For the most part, these discussions compare the 
ontologies or world-pictures of Everett and these rivals. This wide coverage has one 
significant omission: the ‘many minds’ version of the Everett interpretation is hardly 
discussed. So I recommend anyone interested to study what is surely its most sustained 
and detailed defence, namely by Matthew Donald (e.g. his 1997). 
I cannot here report in detail even a few of the book’s papers. I shall instead 
expound why in the last twenty years the Everett interpretation has become a leading 
approach to understanding quantum theory. I will emphasize philosophical issues, not 
physical ones. So I will set aside how efforts, from the 1970s onwards, to develop a 
quantum cosmology lent support to the Everett interpretation. 
As I see matters, there have been three main developments: three reasons why the 
Everett interpretation has moved centre-stage in quantum philosophy. As we will see, 
they correspond to the first four of the six Parts of this book. Thus Parts 1 and 2 concern 
ontology, with Part 1 advocating the Everettian ontology, and Part 2 criticizing it. 
Similarly, Parts 3 and 4 concern probability, with Part 3 advocating the Everettian 
account of probability and Part 4 criticizing it.  
In what follows, I must skip over Parts 5 and 6: regretfully, since they are  
interesting. Suffice it to say that the papers in Part 5 advocate or criticize some rivals to 
the Everett interpretation, such as the pilot-wave approach. Part 6 broadens the discussion. 
 3 
For example, it includes a striking appeal by Deutsch, a very innovative advocate of the 
Everett interpretation, to explore the new physics that it promises to contain. It also 
includes a fascinating history of how Everett came to write his paper: viz. as a summary 
of his Princeton PhD under John Wheeler, who was unduly anxious to tone it down, so as 
to placate his---and most other physicists’---guru, Niels Bohr.  
 
 
2. A bluff? 
Before embarking on these three main developments, it will be helpful to describe why 
the Everett interpretation was widely regarded until about 1990 as obscure and-or 
inadequate, even to the point of being condemned as a mere bluff.  
Recall Everett’s two main claims. Quantum theory can be interpreted: 
      (i) with no funny business about a measurement process inducing the quantum state 
to “collapse” indeterministically, according to which of the alternative outcomes occurs; 
and  
     (ii) with no theoretical posits supplementing the state (traditionally called “hidden 
variables”) so as to represent which outcome occurs---or indeed to represent any other 
physical fact.  
So Everett’s view is that the deterministic Schroedinger equation is always right, 
in the sense that the quantum state of an isolated system always evolves in accordance 
with it. And the quantum state ‘is everything’ in the sense that values are assigned to 
physical quantities only by the orthodox rules. In particular, no quantity is preferred by 
being assigned, in every state, a value; as is proposed, for the quantity position, by the 
pilot-wave approach. But to reconcile this uncollapsed and un-supplemented quantum 
state with the apparent fact that any quantum experiment has a single outcome, Everett 
then identifies the Appearances—our apparent macroscopic realm, with its various 
experiments’ outcomes---with one of a vast multiplicity of realms. These are often called 
‘branches’ rather than ‘worlds’.  
But however sympathetic one might feel to this dizzying vision, one naturally 
asks for a precise and general definition of a ‘branch’. From the 1960s to the 1980s, 
Everettians usually defined ‘branch’ in terms of the pointer-quantity of a measurement-
apparatus. So, rather like the pilot-wave approach, there was a preferred quantity with a 
definite value, albeit relative to a branch. But this sort of definition was not general 
enough, since there would no doubt be an apparently definite macroscopic realm, even if 
no experiments were ever performed, or no measurement-apparatus ever existed.  
Agreed, this lacuna was understandable, since formulating a truly satisfactory 
definition would require one to consider all the various aspects of the “emergence” of the 
classical physical description of the universe. But it seemed that as long as the lacuna 
remained unfilled, the Everett interpretation was at best a vague promissory note.  
 Kent (1990) is a fine example of this sort of critique. Another influential voice 
was that of John Bell, whose work on quantum non-locality, and the experiments they 
inspired, did so much to make the rival interpretations of quantum theory, and more 
generally the foundations of physics, a respected topic within physics.  
For example, in Bell’s masterly introduction to interpreting quantum theory, he 
endorses the accusations of obscurity and vagueness, saying that the Everett 
interpretation ‘is surely the most bizarre of all [quantum theory’s possible 
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interpretations]’ and seems ‘an extravagant, and above all extravagantly vague, 
hypothesis. I could almost dismiss it as silly’ (1986, pp. 192, 194). Agreed, the Everett 
interpretation is not the only target of Bell’s accusations of obscurity and vagueness. He 
has similar doubts about two others in his list of six possible interpretations (which he 
calls ‘possible worlds’): namely, Bohr’s complementarity interpretation, and the idea that 
consciousness induces the collapse of the quantum state (1986, pp. 190, 191, 194).  
Hence Bell favoured two other ‘worlds’: supplementing the quantum state, as in 
the pilot-wave approach, or revising the Schroedinger equation, so as to describe the 
collapse of the quantum state in detail, as a physical process. As he puts it elsewhere: 
‘either the wave-function, as given by the Schroedinger equation, is not everything or it is 
not right’ (1987, p. 201). 
 
 
3. Three developments 
But since 1990, Everettians have made three major improvements to their interpretation. 
At first glance, the first is a matter of physics, the second a matter of philosophy, and the 
third a matter of decision theory applied to physics. But on inspection, and as is evident 
when reading this book: these contrasts between physics and philosophy are superficial---
a happy upshot for philosophers of physics. (Sad to say: John Bell died in 1990, so that 
his writings do not engage with these three developments.) 
The first development is the theory of decoherence. Although the fundamental 
ideas were established in the early years of quantum theory (and were clear to maestros 
such as Heisenberg, Bohm and Mott), detailed models of decoherence were only 
developed from about 1980. In this book, this is represented by three distinguished 
contributors to this field of physics: Hartle, Halliwell and Zurek. (The last also writes 
about his approach to quantum probability; cf. Section 6 below).  
The second development is the application to the problems of quantum ontology, 
especially Schroedinger’s cat, of the philosophical idea that the objects in ‘higher-level’ 
ontology, e.g. a cat, are not some kind of aggregate (e.g. a mereological fusion) of lower-
level objects, but rather dynamically stable patterns of them. This is here represented 
mainly by the opening paper by Wallace, who credits e.g. Dennett (1991) for the general 
philosophical idea. Both the idea and its application to quantum ontology are discussed in 
several other papers: especially the critical replies by Maudlin and Hawthorne. 
 The third is the development of various arguments justifying the form of 
quantum probabilities. I will emphasise one such line of argument. It was initiated by 
Deutsch in 1999, and developed by Wallace from 2002 onwards, and is nowadays often 
called ‘the Deutsch-Wallace programme’. In this book, this line and-or some related 
proposals are discussed by Wallace, Saunders, Greaves and Myrvold, and Papineau; with 
critical replies by Albert, Price and Kent. I should add that by comparing Kent’s paper 
here with his earlier (1990) critique of the Everett interpretation, the reader can get a 
good sense of all three developments. For Kent’s paper here has the merits of considering 
not just probability, but also the first two developments; and of considering in detail 
several other papers in the volume.  
I shall say a bit about each of these developments, in turn. But owing to lack of 
space, and in order to give the Everettians due credit, I shall only report the Everettian 
proposal. So I must ignore the various criticisms that can be made---which, to repeat, are 
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also well represented in this book. I think this restriction is fair, in that even the critics 
would agree that with these three developments, the Everettians have made great strides 
towards rebutting the traditional accusations of obscurity or inadequacy---and so towards 
having an eminently tenable interpretation. 
 
 
4. Decoherence 
‘Decoherence’ means, in this context, the ‘diffusion of coherence’. This is the fast and 
ubiquitous process whereby, for appropriate physical quantities, the interference terms in 
probability distributions, which are characteristic of the difference between a quantum 
state (a ‘superposition’) and a classical state (a ‘mixture’), diffuse from the system to its 
environment.  
In a bit more detail: at the end of the process, the quantum probabilities for any 
quantity defined on the system are as if the system is in one or other of a definite set of 
states. In many models of how a system (such as a dust-particle) interacts with its 
environment (such as air molecules), this set consists of coherent states. These are states 
which, considered as probability distributions, are sharply peaked for both position and 
momentum; so that a system in any such state is presumably nearly definite in both 
position and momentum. (But the distributions have enough spread so as to obey 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle, which vetoes simultaneous precise values for 
position and momentum.)  
For our purposes, decoherence has two important features: one positive, one 
negative. These features, and their consequences for quantum ontology and probability 
(discussed below) were emphasised by Saunders in the 1990s. 
The positive feature is flexibility. Thus we expect the classical physical 
description of the world to be vindicated by quantum theory—but only approximately. 
Only some subset of quantities should have definite values. And maybe that subset 
should only be specified contextually, even vaguely. And maybe the values should only 
be definite within some margins of error, even vague ones. Decoherence secures this sort 
of flexibility. For the selection of the quantity that is preferred in the sense of having 
definite values (relative to a branch) is made by a dynamical process---whose definition 
can be legitimately varied in several ways. Three examples: the definitions of the system-
environment boundary, and of the time at which the interaction ends, and of what counts 
as a state being ‘sharply peaked’ for a quantity, can all be varied.  
The negative feature is that decoherence does not just by itself solve the 
measurement problem. More precisely: it does not imply that the system is in one of the 
set of states (typically coherent states). It implies only that the quantum probabilities are 
as if the system were in one. Furthermore, the theory implies that the system is in fact not 
in one of those states (on pain of contradicting the original hypothesis that the total 
system-plus-environment is in a superposition, not a mixture). To put it vividly, in terms 
of Schroedinger’s cat: at the end of the decoherence process, the quantum state still 
describes two cats, one alive and one dead. It is just that the two cats are correlated with 
very different microscopic states of the surrounding air molecules. For example: an air 
molecule will bounce off a wagging upright tail, and a stationary downward one, in 
different directions! 
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5. Patterns 
This brings us to the second development. It snatches victory from the jaws of defeat: the 
defeat at the end of Section 4, that decoherence apparently does not by itself solve the 
measurement problem. The idea is to appeal to the philosophical view that an object like 
a cat is not some kind of aggregate of microscopic objects, but rather a dynamically 
stable pattern of a special type---which type being spelt out by what we believe about cats 
(by our ‘theory of cats’). Of course, this view is often associated with “functionalism” in 
the philosophy of mind. 
Today’s Everettians---or at least some prominent ones, such as Saunders and 
Wallace---maintain that with this second idea, we escape the quandary at the end of 
Section 4. That is: the final quantum state’s describing two cats, one alive and one dead, 
is a matter of the state encoding two patterns---and the description is entirely right.  
This becomes a bit clearer if we adopt a specific representation of the quantum 
state, for example position. Then, roughly speaking: the final state is a wave-function on 
the cat’s classical configuration space, with two peaks: one peak over some classical 
configurations corresponding to a perky cat, e.g. with a wagging upright tail, the other 
peak over some classical configurations corresponding to a dead cat, e.g. with a 
stationary downward tail. But in that case: according to the idea of cats as patterns, the 
quantum state does indeed represent two cats.   
In other words: we see that we should take the measurement problem to be solved 
by exactly what decoherence secures: a final state describing a living cat and a dead one. 
In brief: the philosophical idea of higher-level objects as patterns vindicates the 
Everettian vision of a multiplicity of objects. 
It is worth stressing (as Wallace, for one, does) that this line of thought is 
independent of quantum theory’s details; and so it is also independent of its various weird 
features (e.g. non-locality). The point is closely analogous to one which we all 
unhesitatingly endorse for several other physical theories. Namely, theories in which 
states can be added together to give a sum-state, while the component states are 
dynamically isolated, or nearly so (i.e. do not influence each other). Examples include the 
theory of water-waves, or electromagnetism. So, says Wallace, we should also endorse it 
in quantum theory, and accept that there are two cats.  
For example: the water in Portsmouth harbour can get into a state which we 
describe as, e.g. a wave passing through the harbour’s centre heading due West; or into a 
state which we describe as a wave passing through the centre heading due North; or into a 
state which is the sum of these. But do we face a ‘Portsmouth water paradox’? Do we 
agonize about how the Portsmouth harbour water-system can in one place (viz. the 
harbour’s centre) be simultaneously both Westward and Northward? Of course not. 
Rather, we say that waves are higher-level objects, patterns in the water-system; and that 
there are two waves, with the contrary properties, one Northward and one Westward. 
Similarly for the electromagnetic field in a certain region, and e.g. pulses of laser light 
travelling in different directions across it.  
And similarly, says Wallace, about the quantum wave-functions defined on the 
classical configuration space. There is a state with two cats, one alive and one dead. And 
of course, there are also myriad other states, the vast majority of which do not represent 
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macroscopic objects (patterns!) which we might recognize (as cats or as dogs or as 
puddles or as mud or …)---or even sums of these. 
 
 
6. Probability  
Finally, I turn to probability. As I announced, I will here confine myself to the Deutsch-
Wallace programme for justifying the form of quantum probabilities (called ‘Born-rule’ 
probabilities, after Max Born who in 1927 first stated the probabilistic interpretation of 
the quantum state, viz. for position probabilities). This may sound, to someone not 
immersed in quantum philosophy, a very arcane topic. But in fact, it engages closely with 
familiar central issues in philosophy of probability, like chance, credence and the 
relations between them, such as David Lewis’ Principal Principle (1980).   
To explain this, I will first clarify how the Everett interpretation faces two 
apparent problems about probability: a qualitative one and a quantitative one. I will 
discuss these in turn. I should also warn the reader that, since I must be brief, my 
discussion will elide some distinctions, for example about kinds of uncertainty, which 
some of this book’s authors hold dear!  
The qualitative problem is that probability seems to make no sense, if all possible 
outcomes of a putatively probabilistic process in fact occur: as the Everettian says they do, 
at least for quantum measurements and the other processes such as radioactive decay, 
traditionally considered as indeterministic collapses of the quantum state. For recall that 
according to the Everettian, the quantum state always evolves deterministically, so that 
during such a process, it evolves to include a term, i.e. a summand in the sum, for each 
outcome. 
Nowadays, the main Everettian answer to this problem---both in this book, and 
elsewhere---is to invoke subjective uncertainty. The idea is an analogy with how 
probability is taken as subjective uncertainty, for a deterministic process of the familiar 
classical kind. For such a process, a unique future sequence of states is determined by the 
present state (together with the process’ deterministic law). But the agent or observer 
does not know this sequence in advance, either because she does not know the present 
state in full detail or because it is too hard to calculate from it the future sequence. 
Similarly, says the Everettian: probability can be taken as subjective uncertainty, for a 
deterministic process of the unfamiliar Everettian kind. For such a process, a unique 
future sequence of ‘global’states is again determined by the present quantum state 
(together with the Schroedinger equation). But here, one can assume the agent or 
observer does know the present state, and how to calculate from it the future sequence. 
That is: the agent or observer is nevertheless uncertain since, thanks to the impending 
‘branching’ or ‘splitting’, she will not experience any such future ‘global’ state, i.e. she 
will not experience the outcomes corresponding to all its terms. At each future time, she 
will only experience one outcome---and is thus uncertain about which. Thus this kind of 
uncertainty, compatible with full knowledge of the global state and the laws, is rather like 
the self-locating uncertainty discussed by philosophers under the heading ‘the essential 
indexical’ (e.g. Perry 1979, Lewis 1979). 
So much by way of a brief statement of the Everettians’ answer to the qualitative 
problem. (As I warned at the start of this Section: my phrase ‘rather like’ papers over a 
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debate between some of this book’s authors about the nature of this uncertainty.) I turn to 
the quantitative problem.  
We can introduce this by again imagining that a quantum system is subjected to a 
sequence of measurements. Then according to the Everettian, the quantum state evolves 
over the course of time so as to encode all possible sequences of outcomes: formally, it 
has a term (i.e. a summand in the sum) representing each sequence of outcomes. For 
example, consider a toy-model in which there are ten measurements, each with two 
outcomes (H and T say!). Then there are 210 = 1024 sequences of outcomes; and so the 
Everettian will say there are 1024 terms in the quantum state.  
Since according to the Everettian, each such sequence actually occurs, it seems at 
first that the probability of a sequence should be given by the naïve ‘counting measure’: 
each sequence has probability 1/1024. And so more generally, it seems that the 
probability of an event corresponding to a set of sequences, such as three of the ten 
measurements having outcome H, is the sum of the elementary probabilities of its 
component sequences. But this amounts to assuming that the two outcomes H and T are 
equiprobable (and that the measurements form independent trials in the sense of 
probability theory). And this spells disaster for the Everettian: the counting measure 
probabilities bear no relation to the quantum Born-rule probabilities, and so ‘counting 
worlds’ seems to conflict with quantum theory’s treatment of probability. 
Today’s Everettians have a twofold answer to this. The first part is to point out 
that decoherence, thanks to its flexibility, refutes the toy-model with its naïve counting 
measure. (This is emphasized by Saunders; cf. Section 4.)  That is:  on any precise 
definition of ‘branch’ for the systems concerned, there will be trillions of branches, 
wholly independently of the number of kinds of outcome registered by the measurement 
apparatus (in my example: just two, H and T). And more important: because decoherence 
is vague, there is no definite number of branches which we need to—or could!---appeal 
to in order to give an account of probability.  In short: the naïve counting measure is a 
chimera and a canard---to be rejected out of hand. 
 The second part is what I have labelled as the Deutsch-Wallace 
programme. This builds on the previous Everettian answer to the qualitative problem, i.e. 
the invocation of subjective uncertainty. Recall the tradition, in subjective decision theory, 
of representation theorems to the following effect: an agent whose preferences for 
gambles (encoding certain degrees of belief and certain desires) conform to a certain set 
of axioms, which look to be rationally compelling, must have degrees of belief that are 
represented by a probability function. (Such theorems go back to authors such as Ramsey, 
de Finetti, Savage and Jeffrey.)  
There is a lot to say, both technically and philosophically, about such theorems. 
But for our purposes, we need only note that these theorems do not dictate a specific 
probability function. This is of course as one would expect: surely, rationality should not 
dictate specific degrees of belief in arbitrary propositions!  
But Deutsch and Wallace prove theorems with precisely this feature, about the 
specific scenario of making gambles on the outcomes of quantum measurements. And the 
probability function that is dictated by their axioms (which, as in the tradition, look to be 
rationally compelling) is precisely the orthodox Born-rule of quantum theory!  
A bit more precisely: Deutsch and Wallace show that an Everettian agent who is 
about to observe a sequence of quantum measurements, who also knows the initial state 
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of the quantum system to be measured, and who is forced to gamble on which outcomes 
she will see (in the Everettian sense of ‘splitting’), and whose gambles are subject to 
certain rationality axioms---must apportion her degrees of belief (as shown by her betting 
behaviour) in accordance with the Born-rule.  
To sum up: we have here an argument to the effect that, pace the above objection 
to the naïve ‘counting measure’, the Everettian framework not only accommodates, but 
even implies, the Born rule. 
Even from this brief and vague statement, it is clear that these representation 
theorems are very remarkable: one might say, amazing! Indeed, they are remarkable, both 
technically and philosophically, and are a gold-mine for the philosophy of probability: a 
gold mine whose first seams are worked out in Deutsch’s and Wallace’s papers and the 
ensuing literature---including the papers, pro and con, in this book. 
 
 
7. Summary  
To sum up: I hope to have conveyed how the Everett interpretation is full of interest for 
philosophy. And this is not just because the original vision of ‘branching’ or ‘splitting’ 
obviously calls out for clarification in relation to topics such as ontology and probability. 
Also, and more important: the three developments of the last twenty years have both 
substantially improved the Everett interpretation and connected it in richer detail with 
such topics. Besides, the state of play about all these developments is conveyed very well 
by this book’s high-quality discussions.  
Thus I recommend the book wholeheartedly not just to any philosopher of physics, 
but to any metaphysician and epistemologist who is minded to have their views moulded 
by the deliverances of empirical enquiry. All future work on the Everett interpretation 
begins here. 
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